Document revision date: 30 March 2001

Section 3.8 describes password grabbers as a class of programs designed to steal passwords from unsuspecting users who log in to terminals left on. The operating system provides a secure terminal server that stops any currently executing process before the start of a login at that terminal.

Invoke the secure server separately for each terminal with the following DCL command:

SET TERMINAL/PERMANENT/SECURE/DISCONNECT term-id

The user must then press the Break key followed by the Return key to start a login. The login proceeds as usual.

If you apply the secure server to all terminals, you can make the login procedure consistent throughout the site by putting the SET TERMINAL commands in the site-specific startup command procedure. However, certain applications that may use the terminal as a communications line need to use the Break key for their own purposes, which would be incompatible with the secure terminal server.

The secure terminal server feature is also incompatible with autobaud handling. However, because autobaud handling is necessary only on modem terminals (switched and dialup terminals), the modem handling on such terminals performs the equivalent of secure server functions. For secure operation, set up the terminal characteristics as follows:

• For local terminals (direct-wired), use the following SET TERMINAL qualifiers:

  /NOMODEM/SECURE/DISCONNECT/NOAUTOBAUD/PERMANENT

• For switched terminals (data-switch and dialup), use the following SET TERMINAL qualifiers:

  /MODEM/AUTOBAUD/NOSECURE/DISCONNECT/PERMANENT

Specify the /DIALUP qualifier if the terminal port is accessible through a telephone line or the equivalent, regardless of the path (direct modem, data switch, terminal server, or public data network).

Always specify the /DISCONNECT qualifier to guard against password grabbers. To prevent disconnected jobs from filling up your system, set the system parameter TTY_TIMEOUT to a low timeout value, which determines when disconnected processes are deleted.

If you decide to apply the secure server to individual terminals, include directly wired terminals located in public areas or remote, unsecured areas. Terminals never used for local or dialup logins are not subject to this security problem. Terminals closely supervised during logins may also not require this measure.

7.5.5 Detecting Intruders

Occasionally people fail to log in correctly because they enter an expired password or make a typing error. But not all failures are benign: some occur because an unauthorized person is trying to log in through an expired account or with an unknown user name or is attempting to guess passwords on a valid account.

The operating system is sensitive to login failures. After one failure, it begins to monitor the terminal, terminal server connection, or network connection where the login is taking place. At first, the operating system records unsuccessful logins in an intrusion database. As failures continue, the operating system not only records failures but takes restrictive measures. The person attempting login is monitored more closely and limited to a certain number of login retries within a limited period of time. Once a person exceeds either the retry or time limitation, he or she cannot log in for a while, even with a valid user name and password. At a later point, the restriction eases, and login is allowed once again.

7.5.6 Understanding the Intrusion Database

The DCL command SHOW INTRUSION displays the contents of the intrusion database; Example 7-5 shows a sample display. The database captures the following types of information on login failures:

Field	Description
Intrusion class	The general source of failure: Network: failure originating from a remote node, using a valid user name Terminal: failure originating from one terminal Term_User: failure originating from one terminal, using a valid user name Username: failure attempting to create a detached process
Type	Severity of login failure: Suspect Intruder The system parameters for threshold count (LGI_BRK_LIM) and monitoring period (LGI_BRK_TMO) define when a suspect becomes an intruder.
Count	Number of login failures associated with a particular source.
Expiration	Date and time when a suspect's record is deleted or when an intruder is allowed another chance to log in. When an intruder's record reaches its expiration time, it becomes a suspect, and the failure count is reset to LGI_BRK_LIM. The expiration time is reset to the old expiration plus LGI_BRK_TMO.
Source	Origin of the login failure: Node and user name if Network class Terminal if Terminal class Terminal and user name if Term_User class User name if Username class

Whenever the system detects an intruder, it sends an auditing message to the security operator terminal or the log file to alert you. Using the DCL command SHOW INTRUSION, you can display the source and type of intrusion. For example, Example 7-5 shows a problem with a user named MAPLE who is logging in over the network. The user has tried to log in 8 times. Because the user failed to log in within the monitoring period, the operating system suspended all logins from OMNI:.BOSTON.BIRCH::MAPLE. Table 7-6 gives a more detailed explanation of how the system decides to suspend logins.

Notice that many suspects appear in the display. Sometimes users forget their passwords or type them incorrectly. To remove an entry from the database, use the DCL command DELETE/INTRUSION_RECORD.

Example 7-5 Intrusion Database Display

$ SHOW INTRUSION

Intrusion Type Count Expiration Source NETWORK SUSPECT 1 2-Jan-1995 13:20:30.89 PCD025:: Intrusion Type Count Expiration Source NETWORK SUSPECT 5 2-Jan-1995 13:36:39.42 DENIM::SYSTEM NETWORK SUSPECT 2 2-Jan-1995 13:25:17.30 N1KDO::SYSTEM Intrusion Type Count Expiration Source NETWORK SUSPECT 2 2-Jan-1995 13:07:57.95 OMNI:.LOWELL.ASH::TESTER NETWORK INTRUDER 8 2-Jan-1995 11:06:50.51 OMNI:.BOSTON.BIRCH::MAPLE Intrusion Type Count Expiration Source NETWORK SUSPECT 2 2-Jan-1995 13:20:10.09 JETTE::TIPH NETWORK SUSPECT 1 2-Jan-1995 13:21:40.75 FTSR::TFREDERICK

7.5.6.1 How Intrusion Detection Works

Once a login failure occurs, a user becomes a suspect and is monitored for further failures for a period of time. The operating system tolerates only so many login failures by the suspect during this given period of time before it declares the source of login failure to be an intruder. In other words, suspects become intruders by exceeding their allowed chances for login during the monitoring period.

The chance count, set by the system parameter LGI_BRK_LIM, defines how many times a person can try logging in; the standard limit is five times. The chance parameter works in tandem with a time factor controlled by the system parameter LGI_BRK_TMO. At each login failure, the suspect's monitoring period is increased by the value of LGI_BRK_TMO. Thus, with each failure, the suspect is monitored for a longer period of time.

Table 7-6 illustrates a situation where evasive action results when user George fails five times to log in. At each failure, the monitoring period is extended by 5 minutes. On the fifth failure, the operating system labels George an intruder and refuses to log him in. (Notice that the example assumes the parameters LGI_BRK_LIM and LGI_BRK_TMO are both set to 5.)

Table 7-6 Intrusion Example

Time of Login Failure	Failure Count	Extension of Monitoring Period
6:00	0	George fails to log in, and the system starts to monitor logins from George's terminal. It monitors for the next 5 minutes.
6:00:30	1	Thirty seconds later, with 4.5 minutes left in the monitoring period, George fails again. The monitoring period is extended by 5 minutes. Thus, the system monitors George for login failures during the next 9.5 minutes.
6:01	2	Thirty seconds later, 9 minutes remain in his monitoring period, and the system extends it by 5 minutes.
6:02	3	One minute later, George has 13 minutes in his monitoring period, and the system extends it by 5 minutes.
6:02:30	4	Thirty seconds later, George has 17.5 minutes in the monitoring perod, and the system extends it by 5 minutes. Thus, the system monitors George for login failures during the next 22.5 minutes.
6:04:30	5	Two minutes later, George makes a sixth attempt. Even though the monitoring period allows the time, he runs out of chances. He becomes an intruder and can no longer access the system.

7.5.6.2 Setting the Exclusion Period

An intruder can be excluded temporarily or permanently, depending on system settings:

• Temporary exclusion is controlled by the product of LGI_HID_TIM and a random number between 1 and 1.5. At the end of the temporary exclusion period, the subject is reclassified as a suspect. The monitoring period of the suspect is set by the value of LGI_BRK_TMO. For the new monitoring period, the failure count is set to LGI_BRK_LIM, allowing one more chance to log in before the subject is reclassified as an intruder.
• Permanent exclusion results if LGI_BRK_DISUSER is set because this enables the DISUSER flag in a user authorization record when the operating system detects an intrusion.

Enabling the LGI_BRK_DISUSER parameter can have serious consequences because that user name is disabled until you manually intervene. If LGI_BRK_DISUSER is enabled, a malicious user can put all known accounts, including yours, out of service in a short time. To recover, you must log in on the system console where the SYSTEM account is always allowed to log in.

7.5.6.3 System Parameters Controlling Login Attempts

Table 7-7 describes the system parameters controlling login and intrusion detection.

Table 7-7 Parameters for Controlling Login Attempts

If You Want to Control...	Set the Parameter	Description
Login time period	LGI_PWD_TMO	Allows time to: Enter the correct system password (if used). Enter personal account passwords. Enter the old password, enter a new password, and verify it when using the SET PASSWORD command.
Number of times a person can try to log in over a phone line or network connection	LGI_RETRY_LIM	Allows a person to retry the login sequence without losing the phone connection or network link as long as the retry time (LGI_RETRY_TMO) allows. Someone can reconnect and reattempt login as long as the break-in limit (LGI_BRK_LIM) has not been exceeded during the monitoring period.
Interval between login attempts over phone lines or network connection	LGI_RETRY_TMO	Specifies the number of seconds allowed between login attempts after a login failure. If there is no user response after a login failure for LGI_RETRY_TMO seconds, LOGINOUT disconnects the session.
Number of login chances	LGI_BRK_LIM	Specifies the number of login failures during the monitoring period that triggers evasive action. The failure count applies independently to login attempts by each user name, terminal, and node.
Length of failure monitoring period	LGI_BRK_TMO	Indicates the time increment added to the suspect's expiration time each time a login failure occurs. Once the expiration period passes, prior failures are discarded, and the subject is given a clean slate.
Association of user name and terminal name in intrusion database source name	LGI_BRK_TERM	Controls whether failures from terminal class logins are counted by terminal, by user (the default), or by user across all terminals. LAT is tracked back to the originating port based on the contents of the TT_ACCPORNAM field.
Duration of login denial	LGI_HID_TIM	Specifies the duration of login denial. The value of this parameter times a random number (between 1 and 1.5) determines the actual length of evasive action when the failure count has exceeded LGI_BRK_LIM.
Intruder's account	LGI_BRK_DISUSER	Enables the DISUSER flag in user's authorization record, permanently locking out that account.

7.5.7 Security Server Process

The Security Server process, which is created as part of the normal operating system startup, performs the following tasks:

• Creates and manages the system's intrusion database
• Maintains the network proxy database file (NET$PROXY.DAT)

The system uses the intrusion database to keep track of failed login attempts. This information is scanned during process login to determine if the system should take restrictive measures to prevent access to the system by a suspected intruder. You can display the contents of this database by issuing the DCL command SHOW INTRUSION, as shown in Example 7-5. You can delete information from the database by issuing the DCL command DELETE/INTRUSION.

The network proxy database file (NET$PROXY.DAT) is used during network connection processing to determine if a specific remote user may access a local account without using a password. You can manage the information in this database with the Authorize utility.

This chapter describes how you design user groups and provide users with the identification (UICs, identifiers, privileges) they need to do their work. As part of the discussion, the chapter shows how to assign proper protection codes and ACLs to objects so that the user can work efficiently while, at the same time, system data and resources are properly protected. The chapter assumes you are familiar with the material in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.

8.1 Designing User Groups

As you design user groups, remember that the groups you establish have an impact on data and resource protection and influence those who receive the GROUP, GRPNAM, and GRPPRV privileges. You may want to map out the functions you expect your users to perform. Look for groups of users involved with a common function, such as accounting, engineering, marketing, and personnel.

Think ahead to future plans in your organization. Incorporate these ideas into your strategy. You can fine-tune the group design at any time, but it is most important to gain a perspective on the logical groupings according to the functions your users perform.

Following are two guidelines for determining the placement of users in UIC groups:

• Sharing: Users who typically share data and control of processes should be arranged in the same group.
• Protection: Users who should not have access to each other's data or control each other's processes should be assigned to separate groups.

However, there are limitations to UIC group design. You may want to give only a few members of your UIC group access to files that you own, or you may want to grant access to your files to members of several UIC groups without having to grant world access. These limitations are described in Section 8.1.2.

8.1.1 Example of UIC Group Design

The fictitious Rainbow Paint Company is a distribution company with five departments: executive, accounting, marketing, shipping, and administration. Table 8-1 identifies the employees in the various departments who need computer resources. The table also lists the job responsibilities of the employees.

Table 8-1 Employee Grouping by Department and Function

Department	Employee	Function
Executive	Samuel Gibson	President
	Olivia Westwood	Treasurer Head of Computer Operations
Accounting	Carlo Ruiz	Payroll
	Rich Smith	Bookkeeping
	Rod Jacobs	Clerk
	Ruth Crandall	Clerk
Marketing	Jason Chang	Forecasting
	Alana Mack	Sales Reporting
Shipping	Scott Giles	Inventory Control
Administration	Jane Simon	Correspondence Management Paycheck Printing

The fact that the company has been organized into departments suggests that individuals in the same department perform many of the same functions. For example, the advantage of grouping all the employees who perform bookkeeping tasks for the company in the accounting department is that employees can easily communicate with one another and gain access to the data they must share.

As the system manager of Rainbow Paint's computer resources, Olivia Westwood will set up UIC groups based on the existing organizational structure. For example, the employees in the accounting department (Ruiz, Smith, Jacobs, and Crandall) could be members of the UIC group ACCOUNTING. Setting up the UIC group in this way ensures that user Ruiz has easy access to data from user Smith, and so on.

Effective department organization ensures that only selected employees will have access to all data and employees in the company. For example, one of the functions of the accounting department concerns payroll. Because payroll information is confidential, employees in the shipping and marketing departments should not have access to that information.

As the system manager of Rainbow Paint's computer resources, Westwood sets up the UIC groups---ACCOUNTING, EXECUTIVE, MARKETING, SHIPPING, and ADMINISTRATION---corresponding to the various departments in the company. Members of a UIC group can be given common access to files, as shown in the following example:

$ SET SECURITY/PROTECTION=G:RWE GROUP_STATS.DAT

With this command, the owner of the file GROUP_STATS.DAT allows each member of the UIC group read, write, and execute access to the file.

8.1.2 Limitations to UIC Group Design

In some cases, UIC-based protection does not present the best solution to your object protection needs. If users in several UIC groups need access to common files and other resources on the system, the only UIC-based alternatives are to give world access to the object (all users can access the object) or to grant extended privileges to each user. Neither choice is desirable.

You may also need to allow users in a UIC group several types of access to files; you may want to deny access to the object to some users in the same group. Again, UIC-based protection does not offer a good solution to meet these needs.

Access control lists (ACLs), described in the following sections, offer another way to protect files and other objects on the system.

As the site security administrator, it is extremely important to familiarize yourself with the subtleties of the UIC categories, as described in Section 4.5. Putting users in certain UIC groups may grant them system privileges, and a user with system privilege has control access to any protected object on the system. The SYSPRV privilege is given by default to all UIC groups less than or equal to 10, but the actual range for the system UIC category is determined by the value of the MAXSYSGROUP system parameter. Putting users with the GRPPRV privilege in groups that own system files might also cause security problems.

	privacy and legal statement
6346PRO_017.HTML